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Abstract
This paper examines the movements of exchange rates and capital in-
ﬂows in an environment where an optimizing central bank pursuing the
joint goals of inﬂation and output targeting engages in costly sterilization
activities. Our results predict that when faced with increased sterilization
costs, the central bank will choose to limit its sterilization activities allowing
target variables, such as the nominal exchange rate, to adjust.
We then test the predictions of a linearized version of the saddle-path
solution to the model for a cross-country panel of developing countries. We
use IV, GMM and simultaneous equation speciﬁcations to allow for the
endogeneity of capital inﬂows. Our results conﬁrm that monetary policy
does respond to sterilization costs.
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With the turbulent capital movements experienced by developing nations in recent
years, many nations have engaged in eﬀorts to slow large movements of capital
into a nation. There are a number of reasons why nations resist capital inﬂow
surges. First, there are a number of concerns about the implications of capital
inﬂows for macro variables. Under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, capital inﬂows
can be inﬂationary, as prices of domestic non-tradables are bid up in the wake of a
capital inﬂow surge. There are also concerns about movements in real exchange
rates, growth in the money stock, and a deterioration of the current account
[Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart ([5], 1996)].
Second, there are concerns about the impact of these ﬂows on domestic ﬁnan-
cial markets. There is a suspicion that large capital inﬂows may leave a nation
exposed to rapid capital outﬂows: some capital inﬂows may be in the form of ”hot
money,” whose owners are likely to ﬂee at the ﬁrst sign of diﬃculty. Another
source of instability is that a nation may have diﬃculty allocating very rapid
capital inﬂows into their most productive uses. This may lead to poor invest-
ment decisions and bankruptcy in the wake of the inﬂow surge. This problem is
particularly severe for developing countries, whose ﬁnancial sectors are relatively
unsophisticated.
Finally, governments may wish to limit the magnitude of a capital inﬂow surge
because of moral hazard diﬃculties. Investors may be willing to invest in even
poor projects in a developing country if they perceive some sort of government
guarantee of their return on their project. Indeed, the onset of the perception
that these government guarantees were not credible has been raised as one source
2of the Asian currency crisis [Burnside, et al, ([1], 1998)].
The choices available to policy makers wishing to stem capital inﬂows are
limited. Policy makers confronted with a surge in capital inﬂows can either im-
plement some form of capital control, through either a quantitative restriction on
inward capital movements or a tax on these movements, or attempt to mitigate
the inﬂationary impact of these capital ﬂows by sterilized exchange rate interven-
tion. Sterilization is usually the ﬁrst policy response to a sudden rise in ﬁnancial
capital inﬂows. Under this policy, central banks swap domestic securities, such
as government treasury obligations, for incoming foreign assets. The net impact
of a sterilization exercise is that the monetary base is unchanged, but the share
of foreign reserves in central bank asset holdings have increased.1
A number of studies [e.g. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart ([4], 1993) and
Frankel and Okongwu ([10], 1996)] question both the feasibility and desirability
of sterilization eﬀorts. Drawing on warnings initially raised by Calvo ([3], 1991),
these studies argue that there are ”quasi-ﬁscal” costs associated with sterilization
as central banks exchange high-yielding domestic government debt for foreign
securities typically paying lower nominal yields.
Estimates of quasi-ﬁscal costs based on observed spreads between domestic
and foreign assets and the size of foreign reserve increases for developing country
central banks engaging in sterilization activities indicate that these costs can
become large. Calvo, et al ([4], 1993) and Khan and Reinhart ([12], 1994) report
1More draconian forms of limiting capital inﬂows include raising bank reserve requirements or
taxing international capital movements. See Spiegel ([20], 1995) and Reinhart and Smith ([18],
1998) respectively for discussions of adverse macroeconomic implications of these alternative
instruments.
3estimates for Latin America between 0.25 and 0.5 percent of GDP. Kletzer and
Spiegel ([13], 1998) report estimates of quasi-ﬁscal costs for the PaciﬁcB a s i n
nations with similar average magnitudes, but their results suggest that capital
inﬂow surges can result in quarterly peaks above one percent of GDP for nations
such as Singapore and Taiwan. However, Kletzer and Spiegel caution that these
are ”upper-bound” estimates of the magnitude of quasi-ﬁscal costs, since domestic
bond spreads can incorporate true default risk premia.
As a result, there are many sources of exchange rate premia under which
uncovered interest rate parity is maintained. For example, Craine ([6], 1999) has
demonstrated that an exchange rate premium will exist when governments lack
complete credibility in maintaining a nominal exchange rate peg, even in cases
where the exchange rate regime is fundamentally sound in the sense of the central
bank possessing adequate reserves to defend the announced peg. The reason is
that there is a true possibility of ending up in an equilibrium in which the peg
is not defended, even if its defense is feasible. A bond spread stemming from
sovereign risk of this type does not represent a true deviation from interest rate
parity.
Alternatively, one could turn to asymmetric information as a source of a true
deviation from interest rate parity. Consider a government that knows that it is a
good credit risk, but is pooled with a number of nations that are poor credit risks
because of information costs. Such an outcome would represent a true deviation
from interest rate parity, and the government would correctly consider a swap of
domestic for foreign debt as costly.
This paper considers the decision problem for a rational central bank faced
with a deviation from interest rate parity corrected for default risk, so that steril-
4ization is costly. The central bank chooses the exchange rate as its instrument of
optimal policy. Other models which consider optimal sterilization policy include
Roubini ([19], 1988) which considers optimal sterilization policies in a static set-
ting, and Natividad and Stone ( [15], 1990), which consider optimal policies under
imperfect capital mobility. Our model diﬀers from the latter by explicitly incor-
porating the implications of sterilization policy for the consolidated government
budget constraint into the central bank’s decision problem.2
The paper therefore follows the literature which models speculative attacks
on exchange rate regimes based on endogenous rational central bank policies, e.g.
Obstfeld ([16], 1986) and ([17], 1995) and Buiter ([2], 1987)]. This is distinct from
the classical speculative attack literature, exempliﬁed by Krugman ([14], 1979)
and Flood and Garber ([8], 1984a), ( [9], 1984b), in which the process of domestic
credit creation is taken as exogenous.
We use a model of exchange rate determination for a small open economy in
which domestic monetary policy is set by an optimizing central bank in an envi-
ronment in which sterilization is costly. To obtain short-term non-neutrality, we
introduce wage stickiness. The central bank then chooses the nominal exchange
rate so as to minimize movements in the nominal rate and deviations from its out-
put target. As in Buiter ([2], 1987), this optimal policy is chosen subject to an
inter-temporal budget constraint. Our results demonstrate that the costs of ster-
ilization, which impact on the inter-temporal budget constraint, are incorporated
by the central bank in its monetary policy decisions.
We then test the predictions of the saddle-path stable solution of the model
2Also, see Daniels ([7], 1997) for a consideration of strategic determinants of sterilization
activity in a two-country framework.
5for a panel of 24 ”dirty-ﬂoating” nations during the high capital-inﬂow period
from 1984 through 1992. We use IV, GMM and simultaneous equation spec-
iﬁcations to allow for the endogeneity of capital inﬂows. Our results strongly
conﬁrm the primary implication of the theory that monetary policy does respond
to sterilization costs. In particular, increased sterilization costs are shown to be
positively associated with increases in the rate of change in the nominal exchange
rate. However, other aspects of the model yield mixed results. The signiﬁcance
of predictions of the theoretical model for coeﬃcient values are found to be sen-
sitive to our treatment for endogeneity, and cross-coeﬃcient restrictions implied
by the strong functional form of the theory are rejected by the data.
2. Capital inﬂows and optimal central bank intervention
2.1. Exchange rate determination under nominal wage rigidity
We begin with a standard monetary model of the exchange rate with nominal wage
rigidities. All variables, except domestic and foreign interest rates, are expressed
in logarithms. We assume that the log of aggregate supply, yt,i sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function of the inverse of real wages and is subject to an identical independent
zero mean shock, ut,e a c hp e r i o d :
yt = α(pt − wt)+ut, (2.1)
where wt is the average wage rate, pt is the price level, and α is an exogenous
constant.
We assume that all agents in the economy are rational and sign one-period
nominal wage contracts for the following period. We normalize equilibrium full-
6employment output to unity, so that
wt = Et−1pt and Et−1yt =0 . (2.2)
Equilibrium in the money market is assumed to be given by
mt − pt = ϕyt − δit+1 + νt, (2.3)
where mt is the supply of domestic currency, it+1is the interest rate prevailing on
claims held at the end of period t and νt is a possibly serially-correlated distur-
bance to money demand. We also impose purchasing power parity,
st + p
∗
t = pt; (2.4)
where st is the spot exchange rate (in logs) expressed as units of domestic currency
p e ru n i to ff o r e i g nc u r r e n c y .
As we noted in the introduction, we assume that uncovered interest rate parity
fails to hold. Deﬁne γt as the deviation from uncovered interest rate parity on
public debt denominated in domestic currency. Assuming that the true proba-
bility of default on government debt is zero, γt satisﬁes
it+1 = i
∗
t+1 +( Etst+1 − st)+γt, (2.5)
The foreign price level is held constant and normalized to one for simplicity (p∗
t =
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where Ω is the constant term
Ω = 1 + δ + αϕ
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2.2. Central bank decision problem
The central bank’s decision problem is to choose the spot rate to minimize an
inter-temporal quadratic loss function deﬁned over movements in the nominal















subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint for the consolidated government.3
The single-period budget identity is given in levels (not logarithms) by
Bt =( 1 + it)Bt−1 + Gt +[ StRt − (1 + i
∗
t)StRt−1 − (Mt − Mt−1)], (2.9)
where Bt, Rt and Mt are stocks of privately-held public debt, central bank reserves
and base money at the end of period t. Gt is consolidated primary deﬁcit of the
public sector for period t,a n dSt is the spot exchange rate in period t.T h et e r m
3We model the central bank decision problem as the choice of the nominal spot rate for
simplicity. Operationally, the central bank may be seen as conducting monetary policy which
is consistent with its chosen spot exchange rate.
8in square brackets is the transfer from the central bank to the ﬁscal authority in
units of domestic currency.
A capital inﬂow during period t leads to an increase in foreign reserves given
by ∆Rt ≡ (Rt − Rt−1). The appropriate discount factor to apply to future public
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BT =0 . (2.11)
Sterilization of a capital inﬂow at date t leads to a present value increase in
future surpluses inclusive of monetization necessary to maintain public sector sol-
vency if γt excludes, as we assume here, any correctly-priced default risk premium.









Unless the government cuts expenditures or increases taxes, the net cost of ster-
ilization must eventually be monetized.
If the date t capital inﬂow is fully monetized at time t+T, then public sector
solvency is maintained if the date t + T increase in the domestic money supply
equals





  t+j  
i=t+1
(1 + ii), (2.13)
the initial capital inﬂow in domestic currency plus the accumulated costs of ster-
ilized intervention. The date t present value of future monetization at date t+T
9is








which grows with the horizon T for positive γt+j. The costs of sterilization at
date t can also be continuously monetized through monetary expansions equal to
γsSt∆Rt at every date s>t . Without sterilization costs (γt = 0), the expected
future money supply increase needed to maintain public sector solvency after a
sterilized capital inﬂow is zero.
If a capital inﬂow of size ∆Rt is not sterilized, the currency depreciates at date





using equation 2.7. Sterilization at date t followed by the eventual monetization
of the resulting increase in public debt at time t+T leads to a depreciation of the



























Sterilization therefore has the same eﬀect as borrowing reserves. It postpones
an eventual depreciation or ﬁscal contraction. With an public debt interest pre-
mium, sterilization leads to a larger future depreciation and a current depreciation.
Buiter ([2], 1987) shows how borrowing reserves can either postpone or advance
the date of an eventual speculative attack under a pegged exchange rate. In his
model, there are no costs to sterilization; foreign currency denominated public
10debt will pay the same rate of interest as foreign public debt. Applying our model
to a collapsing exchange-rate peg favors the depreciation of the shadow exchange
rate.
3. Solution for the optimum





∆ρt as the ratio of net reserve inﬂows to GDP
∆ρt ≡









Inter-temporal optimization by the central bank then leads to the Euler con-
dition,
qt = βEt [(1 + i
∗
t + γt)qt+1], (3.1)
where qt is the costate variable associated with the public sector budget constraint.
The necessary conditions include
qt =
θ (st − st−1)+α(yt − y∗)
Ωµt
(3.2)
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞β
tqtbt =0 . (3.3)
11To derive a relationship between capital inﬂows and the exchange rate, we
linearize about the deterministic steady state. This is given by
q =0 , (3.4)











b =( 1 + i∗ + γ)b + g + ∆ρ − µ(st − st−1), (3.7)
where gt is the primary deﬁcit to GDP ratio (g is the ratio in the deterministic
steady state).
Linearization of the dynamics about the steady state gives
dqt = βEt
 





where the diﬀerential operator is used to denote deviations from deterministic
steady-state values (dxt ≡ xt − x). This becomes upon substitution
∆st = β(1 + i∗ + γ)Et [∆st+1]+βσsi, (3.9)
treating the correlation between the rate of nominal depreciation and the foreign


















The exchange rate equation evaluated about the steady state gives
∆st = Ω
−1 {∆mt + δ∆i
∗
t − (∆νt + ϕ∆ut)+δEt [∆st+1]}, (3.10)
and the budget identity becomes
dbt =( 1 + i∗ + γ)dbt−1 + bd(1 + i
∗
t + γt)+dgt + d∆ρt − µ∆mt. (3.11)
Substitution using the linearized Euler condition and exchange rate equation leads
to the two equation system:
Et [∆st+1]=β
−1(1 + i∗ + γ)
−1∆st − (1 + i∗ + γ)
−1σsi (3.12)
and
dbt =( 1 + i∗ + γ)dbt−1 − µ
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t, γt, ut and ∆νt all be iid4. The saddle-path stable solution satisfying
the transversality condition is given by
∆st = ψdbt−1 + Et
∞  
s=t
(1 + i∗ + γ)
−(s−t)
 
ψ (dgs + d∆ρs + εs)+
σsi
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t − (∆νt + ϕ∆ut)] + bd(i
∗
t + γt).
See the appendix for the details of this solution.
This implies that the change in the rate of nominal depreciation for a shock
at time t is given by




−(s−t) (dgs + d∆ρs + εs).
(3.14)
If we assume that shocks are i.i.d., equation 3.14s a t i s ﬁes
d∆st = ψ(dbt−1 + dgt + d∆ρt + εt). (3.15)
Alternatively, we allow the primary budget deﬁcit, reserve inﬂows, and either
the ﬁrst-diﬀerence in the world rate of interest or shocks to money demand to
follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process. In particular, let dgt, ∆ρt, and εt
satisfy
dgt = η1dgt−1 + ζ1t
∆ρt = η2∆ρt−1 + ζ2t,
and
εt = η3εt−1 + ζ3t,




=0( j = 1,2,3).
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4.1. Single Equation Speciﬁcation
In this section, we estimate our saddle-path stable solution for i.i.d. and ﬁrst-
order autoregressive shocks for a panel of dirty-ﬂoating nations. Our theory is
likely to omit a number of important country and time-speciﬁc characteristics
which also aﬀect the path of exchange rates. We therefore introduce ξi to account
for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects which are time-invariant and φt to account for
time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
By equations 3.15a n d3 . 16, the change in the rate of nominal exchange rate
depreciation of country i in period t satisﬁes










where et is the disturbance term




1 + i∗ + γ
1 + i∗ + γ − ηj
 
≥ 0; (j = 1,2,3)
The above speciﬁcation nests the speciﬁcations under the alternative assumptions
that the shocks are ﬁrst-order autocorrelated and that they are i.i.d. Under both
speciﬁcations, all four coeﬃcient values are predicted to be positive. With the
additional assumption that the shocks are i.i.d. we have the additional parameter
restriction
Ψ1 = Ψ2 = Ψ3 = 1.
15We ﬁrst sweep the data of its period means so that we can do away with the
time-speciﬁce ﬀects, φt. Next, we eliminate the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects by
diﬀerencing the data. We obtain











+( et − et−1)
Our speciﬁcation therefore predicts positive coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst diﬀerences
of the four regressors on the right-hand side. Under the assumption the shocks
are i.i.d., the model predicts an additional testable parameter restriction, namely
that the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst three regressors are equal in magnitude. We use
this restriction to test the hypothesis of i.i.d. shocks below against the alternative
of shocks which follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.
The methodology to be used in estimating equation 4.2 depends on the as-
sumptions we are willing to make concerning the exogeneity of the right-hand side
variables. We ﬁr s tr e p o r tt h eo r d i n a r yl e a s ts q u a r e s( O L S )r e s u l t sf o rt h es p e c -
iﬁcation above. However, these estimates will be inconsistent if the right-hand
side variables are endogenous. This would appear to be a particular problem
for the net capital inﬂows term, as capital inﬂows may respond to exchange rate
movements as a signal of future monetary policy.
We respond to the potential endogeneity problem in two ways. First, we
allow all of the right-hand-side variables to be endogenous and then instrument
for them with lagged dependent variables. This speciﬁcation will be consistent
under the assumption that the right-hand-side variables are weakly exogenous,
i.e. that E(∆Xit∆ is) = 0 for all right-hand-side variables Xit for all s>t .We
16then estimate the speciﬁcation in an OLS instrumental variables (IV) framework
and a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework. Second, we allow for
endogeneity only in the capital inﬂows term and provide an explicit speciﬁcation
which we can estimate using a simultaneous equations framework in the following
section.
4.2. Data
We use a balanced panel of quarterly data for 24 countries from February 1984
through April 1992. The time series was chosen to correspond to a period where
countries in the sample were receiving high levels of capital inﬂows. Data sources
are listed in detail in the data appendix. The summary statistics for these coun-
tries are listed in Table 1.
An issue which immediately arises in Table 1 is that we are pooling across
countries which report themselves as pursuing diﬀerent exchange rate regimes.
Our panel includes 7 countries which claim to have pursued a pegged regime
throughout the period and 10 which pursue a managed ﬂoat throughout the pe-
riod.5 The eight remaining countries in the sample changed their designation
b e t w e e np e g g e da n dﬂoating at some point during the sample period.
Among these various country groups, the greatest concern with pooling would
arise with those which maintained a pegged regime throughout the period. Be-
cause they were attempting to maintain a peg, these countries may have been
systematically more reluctant to adjust their spot rate in the face of shocks than
5Two of the countries switched their exchange rate regime designations during the sample
period from managed ﬂoat to ﬂoat. Costa Rica switched in the ﬁrst quarter of 1992 while the
Philippines switched in the third quarter of 1984.
17countries in a managed ﬂoating regime. However, all of these countries adjusted
their pegs over the sample period, some numerous times.
There is some reason to suspect that these countries do behave diﬀerently as
a group than their counterparts in the other groups. The average level of the
absolute value of log diﬀerences in spot exchange rates, the dependent variable
in our speciﬁcation, for the 24 countries in the sample is 0.0518. In contrast, the
countries which maintained a peg throughout the sample period had an average
of 0.0198. However the countries which pursued a managed ﬂoat throughout the
period were not that diﬀerent, with an average log diﬀerence in the spot rate of
0.0266. It turns out that the greatest volatility was experienced in those countries
which either abandoned a peg in favor of a ﬂoating regime, or vice versa. For
these countries, the average log diﬀerence in spot rate was 0.1158. However, to
maintain a balanced panel, we classify those countries which switched between
regimes as in our ”managed ﬂoating” group.6
Finally, γit is unobservable directly because it is a function of the expected
future spot rate, as shown above in equation 2.5. Estimation of equation 4.2 then
requires some estimate of the expected future spot rate to allow us to construct an
estimate of γit.A n u m b e r o f d i ﬀerent proxies have been used in the literature.7
We proceed under the assumption that agents have perfect foresight in predicting
6To account for potential diﬀerences between these groups, we examined the robustness of
our results below to the exclusion of those countries which maintained a pegged regime for the
duration of the sample. Our results with these countries excluded were very similar to those
for the entire sample. The simultaneous equation results are reported in Table 4, while all of
the single equation results are available from the authors upon request.
7For example, Goldberg (1994) estimates a series of rolling regressions, while Frankel and
Okongwu (1996) use survey data.
18exchange rate changes. While this assumption is somewhat strong in levels,
we note that after diﬀerencing the panel data, which we do below to eliminate
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, the speciﬁcation run is exactly equivalent to that
which would emerge under the opposite extreme assumption that agents expected
t h ee x c h a n g er a t et of o l l o war a n d o mw a l k . O u rs p e c i ﬁcation therefore nests
both the perfect foresight and the random walk speciﬁcations used in Kletzer and
Spiegel ([13], 1998).
4.3. Single Equation Results
The results for the full-sample regression are shown in Table 2. The primary





. This term enters signiﬁcant and positive for all
speciﬁcations with or without the parameter restriction implied by the assumption
that the shocks are i.i.d., i.e. the restriction that the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst three
regressors are equal. The performance of the other three coeﬃcients, however,
reﬂect varying degrees of sensitivity to our treatments for endogeneity and the
application of the i.i.d. coeﬃcient value restriction.
With the ﬁrst three parameters constrained to be equal, all three of these vari-
ables enter signiﬁcantly positive, as predicted, in both the OLS and IV speciﬁca-
tions. However, they are insigniﬁcant in the GMM speciﬁcation. With the coeﬃ-
cient values of the ﬁrst three regressors unrestricted, their performance varies. In





their predicted positive signs, but (bi,t−1 − bi,t−2)e n t e r ss i g n i ﬁcantly with the in-
correct negative sign. After instrumenting, these three variables are insigniﬁcant
in both the IV and GMM speciﬁcations.
19We also report the results of a formal F-test concerning the parameter restric-
tion implied by the assumption that the shocks in the model are i.i.d. For the
OLS regression, we obtain an F-statistic of 13.678 for the test of the restricted
versus unrestricted speciﬁcation. This would imply a rejection of the assumption
that shocks are i.i.d. in our model in favor of our more general autoregressive
speciﬁcation. However, in the IV and GMM speciﬁcation, we obtained a higher
sum-of-squared errors in terms of ﬁtting the original regressors (rather than those
ﬁtted with our instruments) with the unrestricted speciﬁcation than with the ﬁrst
three coeﬃcients restricted. Since endogeneity is a serious issue in this speciﬁca-
tion, this provides some evidence in support of the restrictions imposed by the
assumption that the shocks are i.i.d.
The diagnostic results for the validity of the GMM speciﬁcation are also pre-
sented. We ﬁnd no presence of second-order serial correlation in any speciﬁcation,
indicating that the Sargen statistic is a valid test of the over-identifying restric-
tions in the model. Our results from the Sargen statistic strongly fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions in our speciﬁcation are
valid.
4.4. Simultaneous Equation Speciﬁcation
In this section, we examine an explicit simultaneous equation system with two en-
dogenous variables: ∆ρi,t and ∆si,t. We specify an equation for the determination
of net capital inﬂows using variables which are perceived as correlated with the
desirability of a nation’s assets. In addition to exchange rate movements, ∆si,t,
which might aﬀect investor expectations concerning the path of future monetary
policy, we also specify net capital inﬂows as dependent upon the domestic debt-to-
20export ratio, DEBTit, an index of domestic terms of trade, TOT it, as well as the
current period’s income shock   yit.8 In diﬀerences with the time dummies swept,




= α1 (∆si,t − ∆si,t−1) (4.3)
+α2 (DEBTi,t − DEBTi,t−1)
+α3 (TOTi,t − TOTi,t−1)
+α4 (  yi,t −   yi,t−1)+uit.
The results for the simultaneous equation speciﬁcation with coeﬃcient values





, enters signiﬁcantly with its predicted positive sign. The
government deﬁcit variable, (git − git−1), is also positive and signiﬁcant. However,
the stock of debt, (bit−1 − bit−2), enters signiﬁcantly with the incorrect negative





We also report the results of estimation with a sub-sample which excludes the
nations which claimed to maintain exchange rate pegs throughout the estimation





, again enters signiﬁcantly with its predicted pos-
itive sign. The government deﬁcit variable, (git − git−1), is also still positive and
signiﬁcant. However, the stock of debt variable, (bit−1 − bit−2), now fails to enter
8The method of calculating   yit is described in the data appendix.
9We also ran the simultaneous equation speciﬁcation with the ﬁrst three coeﬃcients con-
s t r a i n e d ,a sp r e d i c t e db yt h et h e o r y .H o w e v e r ,a si nt h es i n g l ee q u a t i o ns p e c i ﬁcations, F-tests
rejected this restriction. The restricted speciﬁcation results are similar to those in the single-
equation speciﬁcation and are available upon request.




, is insigniﬁcant as
before, but now enters with its predicted positive point estimate.
For completeness, we also report the results of the second regression, the de-
terminants of the magnitude of capital inﬂows. As expected, the diﬀerence in the
rate of exchange rate depreciation, (∆sit − ∆sit−1), is a very signiﬁcant predic-
t o ro ft h el e v e lo fc a p i t a li n ﬂows, suggesting that net capital inﬂows are indeed
endogenous. Income shocks, (  yit −   yit−1), are also signiﬁcantly positive, as would
be expected. The stock of debt is signiﬁcantly negative, as would be expected.
Finally, the terms of trade variable fails to enter signiﬁcantly. The results with the
omission of the pegged countries from the sample are similar, with the exception
that the change in the stock of debt fails to enter signiﬁcantly.
5. Conclusion
Our theoretical results demonstrate that a forward-looking central bank will incor-
porate sterilization costs in its monetary policy decisions, choosing more accom-
modating nominal exchange rate strategies the higher is the cost of maintaining
an announced peg or crawl. Our empirical results support this claim. Using a
speciﬁcation which directly follows the linearized decision rule from the theory,
we conﬁrm that the central banks in our panel of 24 developing countries during
ap e r i o do fh i g hc a p i t a li n ﬂows did respond to sterilization costs in their nominal
exchange rate policy.
The importance of these costs in central bank decisions, however, still comes
down to the level of true deviations from interest rate parity. As we suggested
in the introduction, our estimates of deviations from interest rate parity in these
22countries must represent upper bounds, as some portion of the spread paid on
domestic securities over foreign assets must represent true diﬀerences in default
risk. To the extent that spreads represent true default risk premia, rather than
deviations from interest rate parity, actual sterilization costs are reduced.
However, it is clear that developing country governments do behave as if steril-
ization is a costly process. Most countries only attempt sterilization over limited
periods, eventually choosing to either accommodate the capital inﬂow through an
expansion of the domestic money supply or through an appreciation of the nom-
inal exchange rate. The limited duration of sterilization programs suggest that
the costs considered in this paper are incorporated into central bank decisions.
236. Appendix
T h ee i g e n v a l u e so ft h es o l u t i o nf o rt h eo p t i m u ma r e
λ1 =( 1 + i∗ + γ)
and
λ2 = β
−1(1 + i∗ + γ)
−1,
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Data is quarterly from the second quarter of 1984 through the fourth quarter of
1992. For all countries other than Taiwan, the following data was obtained from
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics: exchange
rate, line ae; nominal GDP, line 99b; real GDP, line 99bp; government deﬁcit, line
80 (except as noted below); exports, line 70d; government bonds, line 32an; foreign
reserves, line11; three month interest rates, line 60c where available (exceptions
are noted below); CPI, line 64. Interpolated annual nominal GDP data (line
99b) was used except for: Mexico, Israel, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan, which
had quarterly data available. Data for these variables for Taiwan was obtained
from Financial Statistics, Taiwan District. The terms of trade index is annual
data obtained from the Penn World Tables. Annual foreign debt data is from the
World Bank STARS database, except Israel, which is from Government Finance
Statistics. Annual data was interpolated into quarterly frequencies.
Countries for which line 60c were not available include Argentina (60b), Bolivia
(60p), Chile (60p), Costa Rica (60), Honduras (61), Venezuela (61), India (60b),
Korea (60b), Pakistan (60b), Mauritius (60b). Some missing observations were
interpolated. Details are available from the authors. Interest rate data for
Taiwan was 31-90 day commercial paper rate from Financial Statistics, Taiwan
District. Interest rate data for Indonesia was obtained from Bank of Indonesia.
Data for Malaysia and Thailand were 3 month T-bill and lending rate average
respectively, obtained from DRI.
Annual government deﬁcit data was interpolated into quarterly data over some
range for Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Mauritius,
Zimbabwe, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. Further details are
available from the authors.
25Table 1
Summary of Exchange Rate Regimes in the Sample10
Country Regime11 s Max s Min s
     ∆s
      Max ∆s Min ∆s
Argentina mf-f-p 0.29 1.00 5*10−6 0.36 2.80 -7*10−3
Barbados p 2.00 2.01 2.00 2*10−4 0.00 -6*10−3
Bolivia p-f 2.36 4.102 * 10−3 0.26 2.72 3*10−3
Chile mf 248.75 382.33 77.06 0.05 0.55 -0.07
Costa Rica mf-f 82.36 137.43 44.00 0.03 0.11 -0.02
Fiji p 1.35 1.56 1.07 0.01 0.18 -0.05
Honduras p-mf-f 2.78 5.83 2.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
India mf 16.47 26.20 11.19 0.03 0.20 -0.04
Indonesia mf 1630 2062 1014 0.03 0.37 0.00
Israel mf-p 1.73 2.76 0.24 0.09 0.53 -0.05
Kenya p 21.005 36.22 14.48 0.03 0.10 -0.03
Korea mf 777.72 891.70 667.20 1*10−4 0.03 -0.06
Malawi p 2.49 4.40 1.39 0.03 0.22 -0.10
Malaysia p-mf 2.60 2.78 2.32 4*10−3 0.06 -0.05
Mauritius p 14.611 7.00 12.189 * 10−3 0.13- 0 . 10
Mexico mf 1.88 3.120 . 170 . 0 9 0 . 3 4 - 2 * 10−3
Pakistan mf 19.56 25.70 13.98 0.02 0.07 -4*10−3
Papua N.G. p 0.93 1.02 0.83 0.01 0.13 -0.06
Philippines mf-f 22.22 28.00 18.00 0.02 0.25 -0.07
Sri Lanka mf 34.25 46.00 25.170 . 0 2 0 . 15- 2 * 10−3
Taiwan mf 31.04 40.40 24.65 0.01 0.03 -0.10
Thailand mf-p 25.69 27.55 23.00 3*10−3 0.17 -0.04
Venezuela p-f 30.29 79.45 7.50 0.07 0.93 0.00
Zimbabwe p 2.48 5.48 1.20 0.05 0.44 -0.05
10Source: International Monetary Fund Exchange Rate Restrictions and Arrangements.






















































# obs. 792 792 792 792 792 792
DW 0.0408 0.0401 0.0454 0.0452 0.0465 0.0458
FT e s t 13.6738 0.0512
Sargan 0.0104 0.0306
12Rest. refers to restricted speciﬁcation. First three reressors are restricted to have same
coeﬃcient value. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% conﬁdence
level. ** indicates singiﬁcance at 5% conﬁdence level.
27Table 3
Simultaneous Equation Model13
Equation 1: Dependent Variable: d∆st
Full Sample Pegged Countries Omitted

















#o b s 7 9 2 5 6 1
Equation 2: Dependent Variable: ∆ρt − ∆ρt−1
Full Sample Pegged Countries Omitted
















13Unrestricted speciﬁcation. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
conﬁdence level. ** indicates singiﬁcance at 5% conﬁdence level.
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